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Abstract: Metaethical Mooreanism is the view that without being able to explain how 
we know certain moral claims we can nevertheless be sure that we do know them. In 
this paper I focus on the Moorean argument against moral error theory. I conclude 
that it fails. To show this failure, I first distinguish Moorean claims from Moorean 
arguments, and then so-called presumptive support from dialogical support. With 
these distinctions in place, I argue that the key Moorean claim requires dialogical 
support in order to be used within the Moorean argument against moral error theory, 
but metaethical Mooreans have only provided presumptive support for the Moorean 
claim. Not only is this presumptive support inadequate for fending off the moral 
error theory, it is doubtful that Mooreans can actually provide dialogical support for 
the key Moorean claim. 
 





It seems that we know some moral claims without being able to explain how it is that we know them. 
Likewise, it seems that we can be sure that we do know these claims even when confronted with 
powerful arguments to the contrary. Without being able to say exactly what is wrong with certain 
moral skeptical arguments, some philosophers say that we can reject them and maintain our belief 
in the initial moral claims. This, roughly, is the Moorean position in metaethics. 
 
Mooreanism is not limited to moral matters. It is instead a perfectly general epistemic account. But, 
importantly, it is not best understood as a positive epistemic account — it does not explain how we 
know a particular claim. Rather, it is chiefly a response to skeptical or nihilistic arguments. It is a 
view that explains why, in spite of seemingly sound arguments to the contrary, we can be confident 
that we do in fact know a particular claim. And when it comes to moral matters, metaethical 
Mooreanism is not a view about how we know that some things are morally wrong, but rather a view 
about why skeptical arguments notwithstanding we can be sure that we do in fact know that some 
things are morally wrong.  
 
In this paper I assess how metaethical Mooreanism fares against the moral error theory. In §2 I 
explain metaethical Mooreanism as a response to the moral error theory. In the next two sections I 
dig deeper into the Moorean position to show its structural features. I separate Moorean claims (§3) 
from Moorean arguments (§4). This is necessary to show, in §5, why metaethical Mooreanism 
ultimately fares poorly against the moral error theory. In drawing this conclusion I rely on a 
distinction between two types of epistemic support: presumptive and dialogical. I explain that the 
key Moorean claim initially relies on presumptive support, but in order to fend off the moral error 
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theory the Moorean argument requires dialogical support. I argue that this latter support has not 
been provided, and it is doubtful that it can be. So metaethical Mooreanism does not fare well against 
the moral error theory. From this I conclude, in §6, that metaethical Mooreanism cannot adequately 
explain that we do in fact know that some things are morally wrong. Since this is what the view sets 
out to do, metaethical Mooreanism fails by its own lights.  
 
§2 The Moorean Argument Against the Moral Error Theory 
 
Moorean arguments in general have a readily identifiable structure (McPherson 2009): if a 
revisionary claim (like ‘we don’t know that there is an external world’) is true then a Moorean claim 
(like ‘that I have hands’) is false, but since that Moorean claim is true the revisionary claim must be 
false. This can be schematized in the following way: 
 
Moorean Argument Schema 
If RC then not-MC.  
But MC.   
Therefore, not-RC. 
 
Why call an argument like this Moorean? Because we see this type of argument first used by G.E. 
Moore, who famously argued against external world skepticism in the following way: if external world 
skepticism is true then I don’t know that I have hands, but since I do know that I have hands (i.e., 
here is one hand, and here is another), external world skepticism is false (Moore 1939).1 
 
Despite being a forerunner to contemporary nonnaturalist moral realists, it is noteworthy that Moore 
did not use a similar argument against revisionary metaethical theses (like moral skepticism). So we 
will have to depart from Moore himself in our analysis of Moorean arguments. However, other 
philosophers have used Moorean arguments to bolster certain metaethical views, and it is to these 
defenses that I turn. 
 
The particular Moorean argument that I am interested in here is one often used against the moral 
error theory (Dworkin 1996; Enoch 2011; Huemer 2005; Nagel 1997). Here is what it looks like: 
 
Moorean Argument Against Moral Error Theory  
If the moral error theory is true, then it is false that some things are morally wrong. 
But some things are morally wrong. 
Therefore, moral error theory is false. 
 
Note that the Moorean argument against the moral error theory (hereafter just ‘the Moorean 
argument’) retains the same structure as the schematic version above. Note too that it is structurally 
similar to Moore’s argument against external world skepticism. However, one may note that the 
consequent of the first premise of Moore’s argument concerns knowledge, whereas that of the 
Moorean argument concerns falsity. The reason for the difference is because of the target revisionary 
view. Moore’s original target was external world skepticism, which is a view about knowledge. But 
the target of the Moorean argument is the moral error theory, which is a view about moral ontology 
 
1 I am not presuming that Moore’s argument here succeeds. For some discussion of Moore’s particular argument, see: 
Brueckner (1994), Pryor (2000, 2004), Wright (1985).  
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(i.e., whether there are moral facts, and not simply whether we know that there are). The difference, 
then, seems warranted. And while the Moorean argument can seem a bit fishy, identifying exactly 
what the problem is, if indeed there is one, can be difficult. We can call someone who defends this 
sort of argument in one domain or another a Moorean, and we can call their suspicious interlocutor 
a Revisionist.2 
 
Revisionists sometimes say that Moorean arguments violate the philosophical spirit of ‘following the 
argument wherever it leads’. They also sometimes say that Moorean arguments are question-begging 
or flat-footed. Keith Lehrer says that the ‘commonsensical’ nature of a proposition (like ‘some things 
are morally wrong’) does not confer it with any special or positive epistemic status (Lehrer 1971). 
Barry Stroud says that, whatever else we want to say about it, a Moorean argument should not be 
considered a ‘philosophical’ answer to the Revisionist’s challenge (Stroud 1979). Peter Unger says 
that even ‘commonsense’ beliefs cannot be held in the face of overwhelming evidence, such as that 
provided by the Revisionist’s deductively valid arguments (Unger 1974). Laurence BonJour writes 
that the Moorean “approach has the effect of ruling out even relatively weak versions of skepticism 
absolutely and conclusively from the very beginning of one’s epistemological inquiry in a way that is 
both question-begging and dogmatic” (BonJour 1985: 12). Lastly, Richard Joyce has suggested that 
“Moorean epistemology is an affront to the admirably anti-dogmatic tradition of post-Cartesian 
Western philosophy; better to embrace radical skepticism than endorse such a shamefully missing-
the-point methodology” (Joyce 2014: 847) 
 
But Mooreans have suggested that their arguments are justified, at least in part, by their widespread 
use in philosophy (Kelly 2005). Consider the following: if Zeno’s arguments against motion are true 
then it is false that things move, but things do move, so Zeno’s arguments are false. Certainly we do 
think that things move, even if we might be unable to say exactly what is wrong with Zeno’s arguments 
against motion.3 And even if we are unable to locate exactly what is wrong with Zeno’s arguments, 
we are not, and should not be, persuaded by their conclusions. So giving a Moorean argument in 
response to Zeno’s arguments against motion seems to be a legitimate philosophical response. This 
then leads some Mooreans to accuse Revisionists of metaphilosophical inconsistency.4 Thomas 
Kelly, for one, writes that the Revisionist will not succeed against the Moorean because the 
Revisionist “is implicitly committed to a methodology for philosophical theorizing that does not 
withstand scrutiny once it is forced out into the open” (2005: 197). Because Moorean arguments are 
employed widely in philosophy, and rely on a standard methodology, Mooreans say that it is unfair 
to complain about their usage in principle. While it can be legitimate to complain about a particular 
Moorean argument (for example, one with a false premise), Revisionists at least have to accept that 
the Moorean argument form (i.e. modus tollens in response to the Revisionist’s modus ponens) is 
legitimate. 
 
2 These labels are not standard. Sometimes the debate is cast as between Dogmatists and Skeptics, as in Pryor (2000) 
and White (2006). Other times it is cast between Mooreans and Skeptics, as in Kelly (2005). Sometimes Revisionists are 
instead called the Aw, Come On! crowd, as in DeRose (1999). But I use term Moorean instead of Dogmatist to avoid 
the latter’s pejorative connotations. And I use the term Revisionist instead of Skeptic because rejecting a Moorean 
argument need not amount to skepticism. 
3 David Armstrong says that “perhaps we have still not, after two and half thousand years, got to the full bottom of Zeno’s 
brilliant arguments against the existence of motion … But certainly Zeno should not persuade us that things do not move. 




So the important question here is whether the Moorean argument is sound. Even if we are suspicious 
of the argument, in order to reject it we will need to identify a false or at least highly dubious premise. 
The obvious target is the second premise: ‘but some things are morally wrong’. 
 
Enter the moral error theorists. They deny that there are moral facts, and thus deny that anything is 
in fact morally wrong (Garner 1994; Mackie 1977; Joyce 2001; Olson 2014; Streumer 2017). This will 
have many different entailments, producing many different styles of error theory (e.g. some about 
the ontological status of moral facts, others about moral knowledge, etc.). And while there are many 
such accounts, importantly different in their details, they are usually united by something like the 
following: 
 
 Argument for Moral Error Theory 
Our moral discourse and practice commits us to the existence of moral facts. 
But there are no moral facts. 
Therefore, our moral discourse and practice is in error. 
 
The conclusion of the moral error theory does not explicitly conflict with the Moorean argument. 
Rather, the conclusion of the moral error theory implies that the claim ‘but some things are morally 
wrong’ is false. Take a moral judgment like ‘torturing people merely for fun is wrong’. Moral error 
theorists typically say that this judgment commits us to the existence of moral facts, but they in turn 
deny that the universe actually contains any such facts. So the moral claim here is false. That is of 
course the typical ‘error’ picked out by the moral error theory: our moral discourse and practice 
commits us to something that does not actually exist, in the same way that our discourses about God 
(according to atheists) or witches (according to nearly everyone) are also about something illusory. 
 
In what follows, let the conclusion of the moral error theory, or more accurately an implication of 
its conclusion, be the revisionary claim (or RC). It is this claim that the Moorean argument targets. 
As we saw above, the Moorean argument begins with a conditional: if RC then some particular 
Moorean claim (or MC) is false. In our case, MC is the claim ‘but some things are morally wrong’. 
The Moorean argument uses MC as its second premise. And by modus tollens it follows that RC 
(and, therefore, the moral error theory) is false. 
 
We can now explain why this Moorean argument might seem fishy. It is because the Moorean 
argument centrally relies on a premise that conflicts with the moral error theory, and moral error 
theorists presumably take themselves to have adequately addressed and dispensed with that central 
claim. After all, the conclusion of the moral error theory implies that nothing is morally wrong. So 
when Mooreans not only reintroduce that claim (‘but some things are morally wrong’), but also use 
it as their starring premise, it can naturally raise the suspicions of moral error theorists and perhaps 
non-committed onlookers as well. 
 
Why then do Mooreans reintroduce that premise? I suggest it is because Mooreans think of that 
premise as enjoying what we can call presumptive support. The way I am thinking of it, presumptive 
support is a form of epistemic support. The idea here is perhaps familiar from other contexts. For 
one example, think of the standard presumption of innocence enjoyed by accused parties: one’s 
innocence does not have to be shown (it is presumed), instead it is one’s guilt that needs to be 
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established. 5 What prosecutors have to show is that the presumption of innocence is defeated by the 
available evidence. But one’s innocence is to be taken as the starting point, something that is at least 
initially agreed to by both sides.6  
 
Outside of legal contexts we often invoke presumptions, typically when we presume there are no 
objections to what we are saying unless something is specifically raised. Edna Ullman-Margalit says 
that “there is in presumption a sense of an unquestioned taking for granted, but at the same time of 
some tentativeness, overturnability” (1983: 143). We can mark this ‘taking for granted’ explicitly (e.g. 
by saying something like “if nobody has any objections…”, where silence is then presumed 
agreement) but also implicitly (e.g. by simply saying something that we presume is shared by our 
audience). Indeed, this latter, implicit form of presumption seems to be a natural understanding of 
how Mooreans are using Moorean claims: there is an important sense that such claims are thought 
to be taken for granted.  
 
As we will see, there are commonsensical epistemic principles that explain why some claims (like 
the key Moorean one) should be thought of as having presumptive support. When Mooreans appeal 
again to the key premise (‘but some things are morally wrong’) it is because they think of that premise 
as having the required epistemic support. So it is not as if Mooreans are introducing some heretofore 
epistemically unsupported premise.7 But just as we will go into the courtroom thinking that the 
presumption of innocence can (in principle) be defeated by the available evidence, so too in the 
Moorean case should we think that the presumptive support in favor of such claims can (in principle) 
be overturned. As I am understanding them, Mooreans will accept that it is possible for a Moorean 
claim to be undermined or defeated, and the sticking point is over whether any extant skeptical 
arguments succeed in doing so. 
 
So while the claim ‘but some things are morally wrong’ might at one point enjoy presumptive 
support, it need not (and I will argue does not) forever retain that support. Indeed, I think that 
Mooreans must contend with a subtle shift to their key claim’s epistemic status. When they 
reintroduce the premise as a response to the moral error theory they are no longer entitled to use it 
as a premise that enjoys presumptive support. Instead, because they are reintroducing it as a response 
to a skeptical argument, they are now using it as a premise that needs to have dialogical support.  
 
Think again of the standard presumption of innocence in law. While one’s innocence can initially 
be presumed, it would be odd for the defense to merely reintroduce that presumption in the face of 
compelling evidence of their client’s guilt. Like presumptive support, dialogical support is a form of 
 
5 In particular, from the law of evidence. As Edna Ullman-Margalit mentions, nearly “every text of the Law of Evidence 
contains a chapter on presumptions” (1983: 144). See also Jones (1896), Thayer (1898), and Morgan (1931, 1933). 
6 In law of evidence, the presumption of innocence might be off if evidence comes in that establishes the accused’s guilt. 
In the Moorean case, it is the initial appearances themselves (i.e. evidence) that establishes the presumption. Though 
there is a difference here in the way that the presumption is initial established, the important takeaway is that shared 
methodological starting points regarding assumptions are common enough, as is the acknowledgement that the starting 
points themselves do not once and for all establish the outcome.  
7 An alternative explanation is that Mooreans think the issue here is fundamentally comparative. In particular, Mooreans 
might say that we simply have more confidence in MC than in any of the premises of any skeptical argument that denies 
MC. And if they have more confidence in MC, it would be irrational to believe the skeptical argument. For defenses of 
this comparative approach, see Kelly (2005), Enoch (2011), Huemer (2005), Lewis (1999). But as I explain below, certain 
skeptical arguments specifically target the Moorean’s confidence in MC. Because of this, not only is the proposition itself 
targeted but also the Moorean’s confidence in that proposition.  
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epistemic support. But unlike presumptive support, dialogical support is not prima facie support. If 
a claim has dialogical support, then it has that support in the face of arguments to the contrary. By 
this I mean arguments that have been made, and not merely possible arguments to the contrary. So 
this means that dialogical support is not something that a proposition simply has or doesn’t have, but 
instead is something that is dependent on the context. Which context? One where a given 
counterargument has been made.8 That is what makes dialogical support importantly different than 
presumptive support.  
 
But it is unclear that Moorean claims can enjoy such support. At a minimum, Mooreans have not 
explained that they do. And this is ultimately what is wrong with the Moorean argument. While MC 
can initially be justified presumptively, if MC is used within the Moorean argument it must be 
justified dialogically. Absent this latter justification, MC (within the Moorean argument) is unjustified. 
This is why the Moorean argument will fare poorly against the moral error theory and fail by its own 
lights. 
  
Whether or not a claim undergoes a shift in epistemic status, from requiring presumptive support 
to requiring dialogical support, is subtle but important. I think this shift in the required support has 
taken place within the dialectic between metaethical Mooreans and Revisionists, and that is precisely 
what renders the Moorean argument here unjustified. At one point, MC is justified because it has 
presumptive support. At a subsequent point, MC requires dialogical support to be justified. So in 
order to make this shift clear, I will spend some time unpacking the structural features of metaethical 
Mooreanism. In the next two sections I will clarify the key features of the Moorean argument by 
separating Moorean claims from Moorean arguments. This will allow us to see the role that the 
former play in the latter. And, in turn, we will be able to more clearly see the shift that makes the 
Moorean argument fare poorly against the moral error theory. 
 
§3 Moorean Claims 
 
There is an important yet underappreciated difference between a Moorean argument and a 
Moorean claim.9 The two are not often disambiguated, probably because their relationship is 
straightforward: a Moorean claim is simply one of the premises within a Moorean argument. To wit, 
the second premise of the Moorean argument (‘but some things are morally wrong’) is a Moorean 
claim. 
 
But separating the claims from the arguments serves us well. There are characteristics of each that 
are in need of examination, and the relationship between the two needs to be clarified. So we will 
first deal with Moorean claims, which have two key features: (i) they are basic beliefs; and (ii) they 






8 One important issue here is: which counterarguments are relevant? I explain this in detail in §5. Briefly, the relevant 
counterarguments are going to be those that purport to undermine the presumptive support for the key Moorean claim.  
9 See Lewis (1999) and Kelly (2005) for a discussion of what they call Moorean ‘Facts’. See McPherson (2009) for a 
discussion of Moorean ‘Arguments’. See also Wittgenstein (1969) for a discussion of what he calls Moorean 
‘propositions’ or ‘truisms’. 
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§3.1 Basic Beliefs 
 
Let’s focus on the following two Moorean claims: 
 
HANDS  I have hands. 
MOTION  Things move. 
 
Moorean claims like these are typically characterized by their purported basicness. Whatever else 
we believe, we should at least believe HANDS and MOTION. These function as basic beliefs within 
our mental economy. To say that a belief is basic is to say that it is universally (or perhaps nearly 
universally) shared, that it is not inferred from any of our other beliefs, that it is “self-evident, 
incorrigible, or evident to the senses” (Plantinga 2000: 84). We can understand basic beliefs as the 
expected default presumptions that we all share, as claims that are as evident to us as we expect them 
to be to others.10 The reason we should emphasize the sharedness of these beliefs is because, like 
presumptions in law, it will depend on what our interlocuters are willing to grant us as a 
methodological starting point.11 These basic beliefs are difficult to shake, but they are in principle 
capable of being changed. Even so, we should not draw an equivalence between basic beliefs and 
Moorean claims. While all Moorean claims are plausibly understood as basic beliefs, not all basic 
beliefs are Moorean claims. 
 
Why think that Moorean claims are basic beliefs in the above sense? Take HANDS. One reason to 
think that this is a basic belief is because it is evident to the senses and incorrigible (in the colloquial 
sense of ‘exceedingly difficult to shake’), and one reason to think that it is justified is because we gain 
that belief via our perceptual experiences (which seem to provide defeasibly justified beliefs). 
Remember that Moore’s ‘proof of the external world’ involved him pointing his hands at each other 
in order to demonstrate their existence: here is one hand, and here is another. Moore seems to think 
that this licenses the basic belief HANDS. Now take MOTION. This too is a belief that is not inferred 
from any of our other beliefs, rather it is an incorrigible belief that is evident from our experiences. 
Both HANDS and MOTION are beliefs that are evident to us, and that we reasonably expect to be 
evident to everyone else as well. Even when confronted with powerful skeptical arguments, like 
external world skepticism or Zeno’s arguments against motion, it seems that we cannot shake HANDS 
and MOTION. 
 
We do not have to wade into debates on whether (and how) our perceptual experiences can 
contribute to justified belief. We can instead simply adopt the following commonsense stance 
towards appearances: for claims like HANDS and MOTION “there is a natural presumption in favor 
of taking the appearance at face value” (White 2006: 527). The idea that we have a ‘presumption in 
favor of taking appearances at face value’ will be important going forward, and we can characterize 
this presumption in the following way: 
 
 
10 This understanding of basic beliefs departs slightly from Plantinga’s. He often discusses a belief as being properly basic 
for a particular person. For example, a belief in God can be properly basic for Alvin, even if it is not for me. In what 
follows, I will not index basicness to an individual, but instead talk of basicness simpliciter. 
11 A private presumption would certainly be unfair, but a shared one would not be. Here again the analogy with legal 
presumptions becomes relevant. It would be odd if the defense, but not the prosecution, operated under the 
presumption of innocence. Instead, that presumption is importantly shared between them. So too, it seems, are 
presumptions regarding initial appearances shared in typical philosophical debates regarding Moorean claims. 
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 APPEARANCE   It appears to S that P. 
JUSTIFICATION  If APPEARANCE, then S is (defeasibly) justified in believing P. 
 
Why accept either APPEARANCE or JUSTIFICATION? For the following reasons. First, it is 
uncontroversial that there are things that appear to us. It appears to me that there is a roof over my 
head; it appears to me (as I expect it does to you) that the universe is more than five minutes old; 
etc. That much is straightforward. What JUSTIFICATION says is that if it appears to us that the universe 
is more than five minutes old, then we are (defeasibly) justified in believing that it is. Not always 
justified, or all things considered justified, just defeasibly justified. So from the mere appearance that 
p we can gain a minimal sense of justification for believing that p. If we didn’t accept something like 
JUSTIFICATION then we would really struggle to have any justified beliefs.12 
 
The move from APPEARANCE to JUSTIFICATION provides what I above called presumptive support. 
As said, this is a form of epistemic support. What makes the support here ‘presumptive’ is that it is 
support that we have in the absence of further information – i.e., in the absence of defeaters for that 
appearance. Like the court proceedings mentioned above, we hold presumptions with an 
expectation that we remain open to receiving information that might overturn them. We might think 
of presumptive support as ceteris paribus support, or we might think of the justification that 
presumptive support can provide as prima facie justification. The exact labels are, I think, inessential.  
 
What is important is that if or when more information becomes available this presumptive support 
might be defeated – and at a minimum we should be open to assessing whether it has been defeated. 
Recall again Ullman-Margalit’s suggestion that with such presumption’s there is “a sense of an 
unquestioned taking for granted, but at the same time of some tentativeness, overturnability” (1983: 
143). So we will need to assess whether the support we thought our belief enjoyed still holds. 
 
§3.2 Constraining Arguments 
 
The second feature of Moorean claims is that they constrain philosophical arguments. This is 
standardly characterized in the following way: because of Moorean claims, there are necessarily limits 
to where philosophical arguments can lead. In particular, arguments will not be able to lead to the 
denial of a Moorean claim. 
 
The constraining influence of Moorean claims is widely held as one of their defining features. 
Thomas Kelly says that a Moorean claim is a claim that cannot be undermined by a philosophical 
argument (Kelly 2005: 180). David Lewis says that a Moorean claim “is one of those things that we 
know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary” (Lewis 1999: 
418). Moore himself says that he is justified in believing HANDS because “it seems to me more certain 
that I do know [it]” rather than any skeptical alternative (Moore 1959: 226). 
 
These are all different locutions, but they are compatible. In saying that a Moorean claim cannot be 
undermined by philosophical argument Kelly takes himself to be identifying a genuine constraint. 
Whatever else philosophical arguments can achieve, they cannot undermine Moorean claims. It is 
 
12 The notion of a ‘presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value’ is also similar to what Michael Huemer 
(2001) calls phenomenal conservatism. This view says that if it seems to you that p, then you are prima facie justified in 
believing p. For an overview of phenomenal conservatism, see Moretti (2015). 
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specifically that philosophical arguments are ineffective against Moorean claims, so it is the 
impotence of philosophy rather than the irreproachable Moorean claim that is most relevant here. 
When Lewis and Moore say that one knows a claim better than an alternative, or that one is more 
certain of it as compared to something else, they are each making an expressly comparative claim.13 
This comparative claim is importantly different than what Kelly says, since Kelly does not identify a 
contrast class of propositions. Nevertheless, the comparative claims that Lewis and Moore each 
present seem to entail the constraining approach to inquiry that Kelly suggests. We can see this by 
thinking the following: if one knows some claim C better than not-C, then one can be justified in 
dismissing an argument for not-C. For example, if I know that ‘things move’, then I can be justified 
in dismissing Zeno’s arguments to the contrary. This is why Jeremy Fantl, for example, says that 
“some of us don’t have to feel so guilty about flatly dismissing [an] opponent’s arguments … [because] 
flat dismissal of arguments against [controversial] propositions is often legitimate” (Fantl 2013: 36). 
Indeed, this is why Mooreans often say that philosophical inquiry must be tethered to basic beliefs. 
It is why Lewis suggests that we should build our philosophical theories around certain fixed points, 
and why Kelly reads him as suggesting that “we should make adjustments elsewhere as needed in 
order to hold on to [particular] fundamental commitment[s]” (Kelly 2005: 1). 
 
What should we make of the suggestion that this issue is fundamentally comparative, that we need 
to assess whether one claim is more compelling or intuitive than another? It is obvious that we can 
have varying degrees of confidence about our beliefs. We might want to accept that our confidence 
in a given proposition provides defeasible justification for believing that proposition. However, it 
seems less obvious that our confidence in a specifically Moorean claim will always enjoy (or always 
continue to enjoy) justification on those grounds. 
 
§4 Moorean Arguments 
 
How do Moorean claims relate to Moorean arguments? In particular, what role does a Moorean 
claim play within the Moorean argument against moral error theory? To see the role, we will need 
to understand how a Moorean claim contributes to the conclusion of a Moorean argument. The 
easy answer is that Moorean claims are simply a premise within Moorean arguments. But this easy 
answer obscures the special epistemic status that Moorean claims are thought to have. For that 
reason, we will have to explore the issue in more detail. 
 
§4.1 Justification and Moorean Arguments 
 
In the previous section we saw why a Moorean claim is justified: because it is a basic belief, and 
because basic beliefs can have justification owing to presumptive support. But that justification stands 
apart from the Moorean argument itself. Instead, it lurks in the background. To bring it out we will 
need to introduce a second argument. Recall the initial schema: 
 
If RC then not-MC.  
But MC.   
Therefore, not-RC. 
 
13 Huemer (2005) also argues for a comparative claim. He says that of two equally valid arguments, “the better is the one 
whose premises are more initially plausible” (Huemer 2005: 116). In order to reject a Moorean claim one will therefore 
“have to produce premises more plausible than any moral judgments – more plausible than ‘Murder is wrong’, more 




In the previous section we saw why we should think that one can have a justified belief that MC. This 
is because MC can be a basic belief. What we now want to know is how this information helps us 
support the Moorean argument. Recall: 
 
 If moral error theory is true then it’s false that some things are morally wrong. 
But some things are morally wrong.  
Therefore, moral error theory is false. 
 
Here is one way to see the Moorean claim and the Moorean argument relating. We can accept 
something like the following: if one is justified in believing a Moorean claim, and one can tell that 
believing the Moorean claim entails that one should believe that some revisionary claim is false, then 
one is justified in believing that the revisionary claim is false. 
 
Notice how this relies on the justification one has for believing the Moorean claim rather than relying 
on the mere content of the claim itself. Notice too that the justification one has for believing the 
Moorean claim appears to transmit to the justification one has for denying the revisionary claim. 
This explanation thus looks like an instance of a common epistemic principle: 
 
JUSTIFICATION CLOSURE (JC)  if S is justified in believing P, and S knows that P 
entails Q, then ceteris paribus S is justified in believing 
Q. 14 
 
I think that JC can help us make sense of how Moorean claims contribute to Moorean arguments. 
Note how JC seems to be lurking behind most Moorean arguments. Moore thinks that he is justified 
in believing HANDS. He also seems to (at least implicitly) think that if this justified belief entails that 
the belief in the skeptical conclusion is false then he is justified in believing that the skeptical 
conclusion is false. In doing so, Moore takes himself to be justified in denying the external world 
skeptic’s revisionary claim. 
 
Now suppose that HANDS is indeed (at least defeasibly) justified. What JC does is explain how that 
justification can transmit to another claim, namely the denial of the revisionary claim. And the way 
it does so is through an argument. Consider the following: 
 
 Justification Schema for Believing Moorean Claims 
If S is justified in believing MC, and S knows that MC entails not-RC, then S is justified in 
believing not-RC. 
S is justified in believing MC. 
Therefore, S is justified in believing not-RC. 
 
14 This is Justification Closure construed as ‘closure under known entailment’. If instead Justification Closure were simply 
‘closure under entailment’ it would be too permissive to be plausible here. We would, for example, not have to identify 
that S knows that P entails Q. It would suffice that P entails Q, irrespective of S’s knowledge of this entailment. But we 
should prefer closure under known entailment in order to account for ignorance, on the part of S, that P entails Q, or 
worse, a rejection of the entailment. Consider: if we just accepted closure under entailment, then if S knows P, and if P 
entails Q, then S could explicitly reject that P entails Q but still be characterized as justifiably believing Q. Closure under 
known entailment avoids this problem, and is therefore preferable. Other possibilities here are justification under actual 





If this is right, then we are in a position to see how the Moorean claim (MC) helps to support the 
Moorean argument: 
 
 Justification for Believing the Moorean Claim 
If S is justified in believing that some things are morally wrong, and S knows that this entails 
that moral error theory is false, then S is justified in believing that moral error theory is false. 
S is justified in believing that some things are morally wrong.  
Therefore, S is justified in believing that moral error theory is false. 
 
When the Moorean argument is supported by this argument the result is a better argument. It is 
better because it makes explicit how justification is thought to transmit to the conclusion of the 
argument. Without JC in the background, the Moorean argument can look too much like a flat-
footed denial of the moral error theory. But Mooreans should try to avoid this appearance. Towards 
this end, drawing out JC and making it explicit is helpful. 
 
So far we have separated Moorean claims (like ‘but some things are morally wrong’) from Moorean 
arguments. The reason we did this was so that we can identify the important features of each 
component and the relationship between the two. One important feature of Moorean claims is that 
they are plausibly construed as basic beliefs. These beliefs enjoy justification because we have a 
presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value. This makes it plausible to interpret a 
Moorean claim as having presumptive support. We also saw that one important feature of Moorean 
arguments is that they use Moorean claims as their star premise. Moorean arguments have another 
argument lurking in the background, namely one that uses JC to transmit the justification from the 
Moorean claim to the denial of a revisionary claim. 
 
And with all of these pieces in place, we are now in a position to see the following issue: why and 
how the required epistemic support for the Moorean claim shifts, from requiring only presumptive 
support to requiring dialogical support. 
 
§5 Rejecting the Moorean Argument 
 
At one stage, the Moorean claim ‘but some things are morally wrong’ can be rightly interpreted as 
enjoying epistemic support. It is because it certainly appears as if some things are morally wrong that 
the Moorean claim is (at least initially) justified. This Moorean claim enjoys justification because we 
have a presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value, without which we would struggle to 
have any justified beliefs. 
 
But presumptive support by its very nature is open to being defeated, like the presumption of 
innocence enjoyed by accused parties in court. As we saw above, Moorean claims play a key role 
within Moorean arguments. I explained that Moorean claims are basic beliefs that enjoy presumptive 
support because we are licensed to take appearances at face value. But what happens when we are 
presented with arguments specifically against those same appearances, and in particular our 
confidence in those appearances? If it seems that some things are morally wrong, and if we are 
presumptively justified in believing this on that basis, then we need to take seriously attempts that 
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purport to overturn the initial appearances. Just as the presumption of innocence is strong, a defense 
attorney ought to take seriously the prosecution’s case.  
 
I suggest that when our presumptively justified beliefs are challenged in this way, we are forced into 
a position where we must move on from relying on presumptive support and towards relying on 
dialogical support. When there is a philosophical argument against one of our presumptively justified 
beliefs, in engaging with that argument we are accepting certain terms of debate. One such term is 
that we will provide some added defense of our belief. And this, as I understand it, is precisely what 
the Moorean argument is: it is a philosophical argument against another (revisionary) philosophical 
argument (namely the moral error theory), an argument for why we can continue to believe the 
Moorean claim.  
 
§5.1 Accounting for Error 
 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that a claim that enjoys presumptive support is once-and-for-all 
defeated simply because there is a counterargument against it. The mere presence of the moral error 
theory does not rule out that the Moorean claim can be justified. Rather, I am suggesting that the 
moral error theory targets the Moorean claim’s presumptive justification. Since the moral error 
theory is an argument specifically against initial appearances, the Moorean claim can lose its 
presumptive support. However, it can gain other support, namely dialogical support – but only if 
Mooreans explains why and how. 
 
If this is right then we can see how a problem arises for metaethical Mooreanism. Moorean claims 
play a starring role within Moorean arguments, and Moorean arguments purport to transmit the 
justification of the Moorean claim to the denial of the revisionary claim. But the required epistemic 
status of the Moorean claim undergoes a subtle but critical shift during this process. The justification 
we gain from initial appearances will no longer do, since the moral error theory targets those initial 
appearances. And the way in which it targets those appearances proves to be important. 
 
Because they are suggesting that there is a widespread mistake in our moral discourse and practice, 
moral error theorists seem to owe us an account of how and why we have fallen into error. J.L. 
Mackie said that if the error theory “is to be at all plausible, [its defenders] must give some account 
of how other people have fallen into what [they regard] as an error” (Mackie 1977: 17-18). Similarly, 
Richard Joyce writes that the error theorist “owes us an account of why we [all] have been led to 
commit such a fundamental, systematic mistake” (Joyce 2001: 135). So what moral error theorists 
(indeed, error theorists of all stripes) need to do is account for the error that most people are making. 
Absent this, what is on offer is surely a competing or skeptical account, but not exactly an error 
theory deserving of the name. Any error theory needs to explain the error.     
 
For his part, Mackie attempts to account for our widespread moral error by probing “the projection 
or objectification of moral attitudes” (1977: 42). Echoing Hume (1740), Mackie suggests that we are 
psychologically disposed to project certain qualities onto external sources - not just with respect to 
moral notions but as a more general psychological phenomenon. For example, we seem to move 
easily from feeling disgusted by a creepy-crawly insect to ascribing some quality of disgustingness 
onto that insect itself. When that happens, we have projected the quality out into the world, or 
objectified our disgust. If we are indeed disposed to this sort of projection or objectification, then we 
could expect it to affect our moral thinking as well. We might again move easily from certain 
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emotional responses (e.g. disapproving of an action) to thinking that certain moral properties must 
really exist (e.g. that the action is wrong).  
 
More recent error theorists have provided different accounts of the error. Both Joyce and Jonas 
Olson rely on evolutionary debunking arguments (Olson 2014; Joyce 2001). Bart Streumer differs 
and suggests that what accounts for our error is something fundamentally comparative. If we have 
on the one hand the claim ‘some things are morally wrong’, and on the other hand we have the 
moral error theory, then the reason we have mistakenly accepted the former is because we cannot 
actually believe the latter, even though the theory is true (Streumer 2017: 174 – 177). This is because 
Streumer argues that the moral error theory is actually part of a global error theory about all 
normative judgments. For present purposes the details (about the evolutionary debunking argument, 
about the possibility of a global error theory, etc.) are inessential. What is important is that each of 
these authors is attempting to provide an account of our moral error. They see that by accounting 
for the error, not only will they have targeted initial appearances (i.e. the appearance that some things 
are morally wrong) but they also account for why we all typically believe those mistaken appearances.  
 
This one-two punch that makes the skeptical arguments difficult to fight back against: not only is 
there a competing theory, that competing theory also explains why their opponents would have 
mistakenly believed otherwise. This I think becomes extremely relevant as the Moorean tries to 
reintroduce justification for the once-presumptive-justified Moorean claim – that is, as the Moorean 
tries to move from the Moorean claim being presumptively justified to it being dialogically justified.   
 
§5.2 Dialogical Support 
 
Because a Moorean claim that is presumptively justified and a Moorean claim that is justified 
dialogically look identical, the shift in required epistemic status can be easily missed. So here is 
perhaps one way to bring out the distinction between the two types of epistemic support. Let 
PRESUMPTION be a claim that is justified presumptively, and RESPONSE be a claim that is given as a 
response, i.e. justified dialogically: 
  
 PRESUMPTION  ‘some things are morally wrong’. 
RESPONSE  ‘but some things are morally wrong’. 
 
Admittedly, the difference here is very subtle. But what is important is that RESPONSE cannot be 
justified simply because we have a presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value. It instead 
must be licensed by something besides that presumption. Why think this? Because the moral error 
theory targets the presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value. In particular, we now 
have a (purported, but not conclusive) defeater for the presumptive support of the Moorean claim. 
The moral error theorist will say that, though it certainly appears that some things are morally wrong, 
we should give up this thought if the moral error theory is not only valid but also sound. And if this 
is right, then the Moorean claim cannot simply be wheeled in again within the Moorean argument if 
it relies only on presumptive support. 
 
We should accept that PRESUMPTION is at one point justified. But what the Moorean owes us now 
is an explanation for why RESPONSE is also justified, that is, why using it as a response to a skeptical 
argument is justified. If RESPONSE is justified because we infer it from PRESUMPTION then this merely 
presumes that the presumptive support for the Moorean claim still holds. And this move is 
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illegitimate in the face of the skeptical argument, because there is a purported defeater for the 
presumptive support that has gone unaddressed. It would be like the defense attorney merely 
appealing to the presumption of their client’s innocence in the face of evidence of their guilt 
(“certainly the evidence presented seems to incriminate my client, but recall the presumption that 
my client is innocent.”) In particular, if the moral error theorist not only provides a skeptical 
argument but also accounts for the Moorean’s mistake presumption, then RESPONSE being inferred 
straight from PRESUMPTION seems egregiously dogmatic. So it is worth exploring other justificatory 
strategies for the Moorean claim.  
 
When faced with a revisionary or skeptical thesis, like the moral error theory, some Mooreans might 
respond in the following way: if we believe the Moorean claim (‘that some things are morally wrong’), 
and if we have no reason to accept a competing revisionary thesis, then we are justified in believing 
the Moorean claim. There is a slight difference here as compared to the presumptive support 
provided by our taking appearances at face value, but I think the difference is worth spelling out. 
 
On the one hand, to say that we should take appearances at face value is just to say that we have a 
default presumption in favor of thinking something is true if it strikes us as true. As stressed, this 
presumptive support about appearances can provide defeasible justification regarding our beliefs 
about those appearances. On the other hand, when we say that we are justified in believing a 
Moorean claim if we have no reason to accept a revisionary claim, we are specifically making a 
dialogical point. In this latter case, we are highlighting that there is a response that we think we are 
licensed to give when confronted with a revisionary or skeptical argument. 
 
It is important to recognize that there is a dialogical process involved in this latter case. If there is 
justification in the former case it is achieved presumptively. But this justification can in principle be 
defeated, specifically by an argument that adequately explains away those appearances. When this 
happens, if justification is going to be regained it will have to be because a claim has newfound 
dialogical support. This latter form of support is one that can only be gained when faced with 
arguments or when pressed to give responses. 
 
We can adopt the following characterization for this dialogical support: if it appears to S that p, and 
S has no reason to suspect that any revisionary or skeptical alternative to p is true, then S is justified 
in believing p (White 2006: 527).15 It is important here that by ‘any’ alternative we at least restrict this 
to any argument that has been made. Working from this characterization, let us separate out the 
following claims: 
 
 APPEARANCE   It appears to S that p. 
NO REASON   S has no reason to suspect that any revisionary alternative to p is true. 
JUSTIFICATION*  If APPEARANCE and NO REASON then S is justified in believing p. 
 
The inclusion of NO REASON makes the argument different than the presumptive reasoning that we 
looked at above. What does it mean to say that S has no reason to suspect that any revisionary claim 
 
15 White (2006) calls this Dogmatism. But, as said, in order to avoid pejorative connotations, I eschew the term in favor 
of Mooreanism. And see Huemer (2007) for a more recent defense of phenomenal conservatism, in particular one that 
explicitly mentions the presence of defeaters. 
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is true? Plausibly, that there is no revisionary claim that is rationally compelling.16 Valid arguments 
can be rationally compelling; sound arguments even more so. Whether that is the case or not 
depends on the quality of the arguments involved. So what we are looking for here is whether or not 
there are epistemic defeaters for our belief. 
 
If we have presumptive support for a claim then we can easily move from APPEARANCE to 
JUSTIFICATION. In the absence of further information, we are justified in believing that things are 
just as they appear to be. But when we include NO REASON, if we are to get JUSTIFICATION* it must 
be because we are specifically entertaining or evaluating other possibilities. What needs to be stressed 
here is the difference between JUSTIFICATION and JUSTIFICATION*, and how it is NO REASON (or 
the presence of defeaters) that makes the latter different. The former relies on presumptive support, 
which is something we have in the absence of further information, and the latter on dialogical 
support, which is something we gain only after the back and forth of arguments. And the reason the 
difference between JUSTIFICATION and JUSTIFICATION* is important is because it shows how the 
Moorean argument fares poorly against the moral error theory. 
 
The Moorean claim ‘but some things are morally wrong’ (or what we’re now entertaining as 
PRESUMPTION) was justified presumptively. Because it appears to us that some things are morally 
wrong we are thereby justified in believing that some things are morally wrong. But the similar 
Moorean claim ‘but something things are morally wrong’ (or what we’re now calling RESPONSE) 
cannot be justified presumptively. Rather, it must be justified dialogically. This is again because 
RESPONSE is being presented as a response to a skeptical argument (namely the moral error theory). 
So the Moorean must offer a new explanation for why RESPONSE is justified here, because they 
cannot say that RESPONSE is justified because PRESUMPTION is justified. To do so would be to ignore 
the fact that RESPONSE is being given as a dialogical response to a skeptical argument. So RESPONSE 
is going to have to be justified in some other way, and not because we have a presumption in favor 
of taking appearances at face value. 
 
Though this seems like a challenge that Mooreans might be able to meet, there are obstacles awaiting 
them. Recall that one of the key features of Moorean claims is that they are basic beliefs, and that 
such beliefs gain justification because we can sometimes believe that things are just as they appear to 
us to be. But if the Moorean cannot rely on that particular Moorean claim and its attendant 
justification when confronted with the moral error theory then what can they use in their defense? If 
they double-down and say that RESPONSE is justified because PRESUMPTION is justified then they 
have flatly ignored the moral error theory. They will have mistakenly thought that the presumptive 
justification still holds. And while this does not rule out that the key Moorean claim can be justified, 
it does rule out that it is justified presumptively. So Mooreans will have to provide some other reason 
to think that RESPONSE is justified. But this justification has not been provided, and that is why the 




We might wonder how far the case I have made against the Moorean argument generalizes. Recall 
that I started out by noting that Moorean’s appeal to the widespread use of Moorean arguments. 
 
16 Plausibly, NO REASON means that the revisionary or skeptical alternative to p is not rationally compelling. This would 
entail that S has no reason to suspect that p is true.  
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One such Moorean argument that everyone seems comfortable making is in response to Zeno’s 
arguments against motion. As Armstrong says “certainly Zeno should not persuade us that things do 
not move. Neither should anybody else” (Armstrong 1999: 79). But in light of my argument above, 
one worry might be that my critique of the Moorean argument against the moral error theory works 
equally well against this Moorean argument against Zeno. That is, it seems that the Moorean 
argument against Zeno has presumptive support but lacks dialogical support, and since it is the latter 
that the Moorean argument really needs it therefore fares poorly against Zeno’s arguments.  
 
But I do not think that Zeno has the upper hand here, and in explaining why I think we can draw a 
more general conclusion, about when Moorean arguments are legitimately used and when they seem 
abused. If one initially believes that ‘things move’ (i.e. MOTION), then this is presumably licensed by 
the presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value. But if one uses that judgment within 
an argument against a revisionary view (like Zeno’s arguments against motion), then one cannot be 
said to be relying on a ‘mere’ presumption any longer. As I have said, the justification we gain from 
initial appearances will no longer do. So does the Moorean argument against Zeno lack the required 
(i.e. dialogical) support? I think not. While Zeno’s arguments against motion do target MOTION, 
they do not do so in a way that defeats or undermines those initial appearances. Defenders of this 
arguments have not provided an undermining or debunking account for MOTION. While they are 
clearly suggesting that we are making in error in accepting that claim, they have not accounted for 
the error. What explains why we falsely believe that things move? Zeno is silent here.  
 
The general conclusion that I think we can draw is that Moorean arguments fare especially poorly 
against skeptical arguments that also account for the error. Sometimes it may be enough to remove 
the presumptive support. Other times in may be that removing presumptive support needs to be 
coupled by an adequate account of why there is an error in the first place. This later coupling occurs 
in the debate between moral error theorists and their Moorean opponents. But it is noticeably 
lacking when it comes to Zeno’s arguments against MOTION. So while we can accept the Moorean 
argument against Zeno, we should not accept the Moorean argument against the moral error theory.  
 
Let me be clear about what I take this to demonstrate. It does not show that the key Moorean claim 
(‘but some things are morally wrong’) cannot be justified. Rather, it shows that while a Moorean 
claim can be initially justified (i.e., presumptively) because we are licensed to take appearances at 
face value, when it is given in response to the moral error theory that claim can no longer be justified 
in that same way. This is because presumptive support only works in the absence of further 
information. But further information has been given, in the form of the moral error theory, which is 
specifically an argument against the key Moorean claim, and so an argument against initial 
appearances. Some moral error theorists also go further and account for the error, which makes the 
Moorean’s job that much more difficult. So now, if the Moorean claim is going to regain its 
justificatory standing then it must not be presumptively but rather dialogically. The Moorean must 
provide some other argument in favor of the justification of the key Moorean claim, because the 
presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value no longer holds. But Mooreans have not 
provided these arguments. 
 
In light of that, we should think that metaethical Mooreanism cannot adequately explain that we do 
in fact have successful moral judgments. The view needs to be able to explain why Moorean claims 
are justified. Ordinarily it can do so by noting that Moorean claims are basic beliefs, and that basic 
beliefs are justified via a presumption in favor of taking appearances at face value. But this avenue of 
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explanation is not available for the Moorean argument. Because the Moorean argument is a response 
to a skeptical argument, it cannot rely on the presumptively justified Moorean claim. To do so would 
be to flatly ignore that it is being given in response to a skeptical argument. So the Moorean owes us 
an explanation for why we can continue to think that the key Moorean claim is justified. But 
Mooreans have not offered this explanation, and it is doubtful that they can. 
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